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I. INTRODUCTION 
The most important safety decision concerning MRIs was to change the 
name of the procedure.  In the late 1970s, the procedure known as nuclear 
magnetic resonance (NMR) became magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) 
because of the negative connotations the word “nuclear” invited.1  Since then, 
the use of MRIs has flourished.  The procedure is now routinely conducted to 
make medical diagnoses and to study the brain functioning of healthy 
volunteers participating in research studies devised by, among others, 
neuroscientists and economists.  
There is nothing intrinsically wrong with changing a procedure’s name to 
respond to a public perception of risk, especially when experts do not share 
that perception.  Yet, while MRIs rarely injure patients or test subjects,2 there 
is reason to believe that they have important health and safety consequences 
not captured in standard informed consent forms.  These concerns ironically 
involve perception of risk.  On the one hand, unexpected incidental findings of 
clinically significant conditions in volunteer research subjects raise a host of 
ethical concerns.  On the other hand, clinically irrelevant MRI findings 
sometimes lead to needless and dangerous interventions.  In both cases, risk 
perception plays a role in understanding and dealing with the problem.  The 
name change from NMR to MRI, however, will not exempt this procedure 
from difficult choices in the years ahead. 
The following takes a closer look at the role risk perception plays in the 
use of MRIs to study brain functioning.  Part II begins by describing the 
history of nuclear magnetic resonance, a history that illustrates the way basic 
research led to unimagined practical applications decades later.  Part III turns 
to the history of the name change, which includes a formal vote by the 
American College of Radiology to remove the word “nuclear” from the 
procedure to allay public fears.3  Part IV discusses the recent literature on the 
difficult problem of what to do when an MRI administered to a presumably 
healthy volunteer in a research setting reveals the possibility of a medical 
problem that may or may not be clinically relevant, but which will cause fear 
                                                 
†  Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1  See discussion infra Part III. 
2  See discussion infra Part IV. 
3  Thomas F. Meaney, Magnetic Resonance Without Nuclear, 150 Radiology 277, 277 
(1984). 
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in either case.  This problem—which has medical, legal and ethical 
dimensions—deserves the full attention of the research community.  Finally, 
this article concludes with a brief summary of the legal implications of the risk 
perceptions of research subjects. 
II. HISTORICAL EMERGENCE OF NUCLEAR MAGNETIC RESONANCE 
The development of MRIs began with early twentieth century research on 
the quantum mechanical nature of the atomic nucleus.4  The story, in highly 
simplified terms, goes like this.  In the 1930s, the physicist I. I. Rabi, working 
at Columbia University, began to study the magnetic properties of atoms.5  He 
bathed lithium chloride molecules with magnetic fields and radio waves in a 
successful effort to induce and measure the resonance frequency that occurs 
when the nucleus absorbs energy from the radio signal that is equal to a 
particular change in its energy state.6  This technique enabled Rabi to learn a 
tremendous amount about how atoms are bound together and how their 
nuclei are affected by nearby atoms.7  
In the 1940s, Edward Purcell at Harvard and Felix Bloch at Stanford, 
working independently, each developed ways to observe the magnetic 
resonance of the proton—the nucleus of the hydrogen atom—in liquids and 
solids.8  Rabi worked with isolated molecules.  By working with solids and 
liquids, Purcell, Bloch, and researchers who followed, were able to probe the 
internal structure of a variety of materials, making it possible for chemists, 
biologists, and physicists to analyze the structure of molecules.9  The 
technique pioneered by Purcell and Bloch came to be called nuclear magnetic 
resonance (NMR). 
It was not until 1969 that Raymond Damadian, a physician at the 
Downstate Medical Center in Brooklyn, New York, began to do experiments 
designed to show that NMR could be used to probe living tissue for signs of 
disease.10  It was not an obvious idea.  NMR specialists at the time were 
accustomed to spinning their test-tube samples to achieve greater 
homogeneity.  When Damadian proposed using NMR on people, he was 
asked, “How fast do you propose to spin the patient, Doctor?”11 
                                                 
4  This account of the scientific origins of MRI technology is drawn from two sources.  
The National Academy of Sciences has produced a series of articles on basic research entitled 
Beyond Discovery.  See http://www.beyonddiscovery.org/content/view.article.asp?=60 (last 
visited September 21, 2006).  The article on Magnetic Resonance Imaging is my primary 
source.  See Roberta Conlan, A Life-Saving Window on the Mind and Body: The Development 
of Magnetic Resonance Imaging, Beyond Discovery, Mar. 9, 2001, 
http://www.beyonddiscovery.org/content/view.txt.asp?a=129 [hereinafter NAS] (last visited 
September 21, 2006).  To a lesser degree, I relied on the far more detailed account in the 
leading text on the history of MRIs, James Mattson & Merrill Simon, The Story of MRI: 
The Pioneers of NMR and Magnetic Resonance in Medicine (1996) [hereinafter 
Mattson]. 
5  NAS, supra note 4. 
6  Id. 
7  Id. 
8  Id. 
9  Id. 
10  Id. 
11  Mattson, supra note 4, at 613. 
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Vital breakthroughs by the chemist Paul Lauterbur at the State University 
of New York at Stony Brook and the physicist Peter Mansfield at the 
University of Nottingham, England, made the application of NMR to humans 
possible.12  Working in the early 1970s, they developed ways to use multiple 
magnetic fields in conjunction with radio frequencies to get remarkable 
results with living tissue.13  In the 1980s, other researchers demonstrated that 
resonance imaging could capture an organism in action; in other words, it 
could show biological functioning such as changes in blood flow in the brain.14  
The medical and research implications of these developments have 
exploded in recent decades.  Today, doctors worldwide perform over sixty-
million MRI procedures a year to identify tumors, diagnose brain disease, and 
so on.15  Since the mid-1990s, neuroscientists have used this approach to study 
the roles played by various parts of the brain in recognizing visual patterns, 
processing emotions, and the like.16  Economists and other social scientists 
have joined in, using brain scans to study the reactions of volunteers in 
experiments studying such matters as financial investment decisions, social 
rejection by peers, and moral judgments.17 
This is a classic story of the nature of basic research.  The early work on 
NMR was basic science at the highest level: Rabi, Purcell, Bloch, Lauterbur, 
and Mansfield all won Nobel Prizes.18  The research began with a curiosity 
about the nature of the world rather than a search for practical applications.  
I. I. Rabi was thinking about the quantum states of the atom, not brain 
functioning, just as Einstein was not aiming for the creation of nuclear 
energy.19  Yet the basic research was a vital precondition for the applications 
we see today.  It is clear that George Pake, a student of Purcell, was correct 
when he said in 1993, “Without the basic research, magnetic resonance 
imaging was unimaginable.”20  
III. THE TRANSITION FROM “NMR” TO “MRI” 
When magnetic resonance imaging was first applied to human patients, it 
was called Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR).21  By the early 1980s, when 
the procedure had begun to spawn a large commercial enterprise, the medical 
community dropped the word “nuclear” and began to speak simply of 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI).22  In 1983, the American College of 
Radiology’s Commission on Nuclear Magnetic Resonance formally 
recommended dropping the word “nuclear” from the name of the procedure, 
                                                 
12  NAS, supra note 4. 
13  Id. 
14  See id.  
15  Tom Siegfried, MRI Nobel Signals New Way to Teach Science, Dallas Morning 
News, Oct. 13, 2003, at 3E. 
16  John Cassidy, Mind Games: What Neuroeconomoics Tells Us About Money and the 
Brain, The New Yorker, Sept. 18, 2006, at 32. 
17  See, e.g., Michael D’Antonio, How We Think: Brain Researchers Are Using MRIs to 
Predict Our Decisions Before They Are Made, L.A. Times Magazine, May 2, 2004, at 18. 
18  NAS, supra note 4; Siegfried, supra note 15. 
19  See Steven Goldberg, Culture Clash: Law and Science in America 132 (1994). 
20  NAS, supra note 4. 
21  Meaney, supra note 3, at 277. 
22  NAS, supra note 4. 
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in part because “the deletion of ‘Nuclear’ may be helpful in eliminating 
undesirable connotations in the minds of the public.”23  A National Academy 
of Sciences publication said of the name change, “‘Nuclear’ had been quietly 
dropped from the name . . . because of its unfavorable connotations.”24  Joel D. 
Howell, an expert in the history of medicine, put it more bluntly:  
It is of some interest that MRI has long been used for the study of 
inanimate objects under the name of NMR, for nuclear magnetic 
resonance.  When the technology started to be applied to human 
beings, the name was changed to MRI so as not to frighten 
people by using a machine with the name “nuclear.”25  
There is, however, a gain in clarity when the word “nuclear” is dropped 
from the name.  For example, MRIs, unlike x-rays, do not expose patients to 
radioactivity.26  The term “nuclear magnetic resonance” derived from the 
nature of the original basic research of Rabi and others, which concerned 
fundamental properties of the atomic nucleus.   
One unintended consequence of dropping the word “nuclear” from the 
name of the now-common MRI procedure is that few people are aware of how 
research in theoretical physics led to this medical marvel.  This has caused 
some grumbling in the physics community.  The Nobel Laureate physicist 
Leon Lederman has long supported increased government funding for basic 
research.27  In 1982, when MRIs were bursting onto the scene, Lederman 
wrote a letter to the New York Times after a story appeared touting the 
medical benefits of this new technology: 
A November 28 news article by Jane Brody, “Magnetic Device 
Lifts Hopes for Diagnosis Without X-Ray,” treated front-page 
readers to a cogent account of a revolutionary medical diagnostic 
technique . . . .  Your business section and many Wall Street 
publications have long been much taken with the predicted near-
billion-dollar market for this remarkable scanning device.  What 
is not made clear to either set of readers is the NMR is a classic 
example of the payoff of basic, abstract, pure research.  The NMR 
technique was invented by E. Purcell (Harvard) and F. Bloch 
(Stanford) in 1946, based upon the atomic resonance work of I.I. 
Rabi (Columbia).  All three were awarded Nobel Prizes for their 
work . . . .  
                                                 
23  Meaney, supra note 3, at 277. 
24  Id.  The leading text on the history of MRIs says the name change was undertaken 
“primarily to avoid the misleading implication that the technology uses radioactive materials.”  
Mattson, supra note 4, at 613. . 
25  Joel D. Howell, Symposium on Biomedical Technology and Health Care: Social and 
Conceptual Transformations: Technical Article: Diagnostic Technologies: X-Rays, 
Electrocardiograms, and CAT Scans, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 529, 529 n.2 (1991). 
26  See, e.g., Judith Vandewater, Overused Technology Can Be Dangerous As Well as 
Expensive, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Sept. 26, 2004, at A11. 
27  He led an unsuccessful effort to fund the Super Collider.  See Steven Goldberg, 
Seduced By Science: How American Religion Has Lost Its Way 119 (1999). 
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This example of benefits to society of basic research—in better 
medicine and in taxes returned to the Treasury—needs to be told 
and retold; it is not easy to hold the attention of policy makers.28 
But the real story about the transformation from NMR to MRI is not the 
story of research on the atomic nucleus, nor the impact on funding for basic 
research.  Moreover, the “unfavorable connotations” of the word “nuclear” 
stem not just from x-ray exposure, but from more general concerns about the 
risks of nuclear energy.  America’s nuclear power plants had become 
increasingly controversial in the 1970s, a process that culminated with the 
accident at Three-Mile Island in 1979.29  It was just around this time that 
NMR understandably became MRI. 
There are certainly analysts who believe that Americans are overly or 
irrationally risk averse when it comes to exposure to radiation.30  But doctors 
who want to advance the use of a technology that does not expose patients to 
radioactivity can hardly be faulted for making a name change that removes 
the word “nuclear.”  Fears, whether rational or not, are a part of the public’s 
decision-making, a reality that policy makers cannot easily avoid.31  Even 
when radiation is present, proponents of a technology are not likely to tout 
that fact.  For example, it is doubtful that there has ever been an 
advertisement for a “nuclear-powered” smoke detector, but in fact, most 
smoke detectors use americium-241, which emits small amounts of 
radiation.32 
The word “nuclear,” however, is not the only word that researchers want 
to avoid.  Some researchers are currently mounting a campaign to remove the 
word “cloning” from the name of a promising technique.33  
At present, the phrase “human cloning” includes two distinct activities—
reproductive cloning and therapeutic cloning.34  They begin the same way.  
Nuclear material is taken from a woman’s egg while nuclear material from a 
donor’s somatic cells is introduced in its place.35  The egg then begins to 
develop just as a traditional fertilized ovum does.  In reproductive cloning 
(which may or may not be possible with humans), however, this developing 
embryo is implanted in a uterus and brought to term.36  If a baby is born it 
would have essentially the same genetic make-up as the donor.  Reproductive 
cloning is intensely controversial and has very few supporters. 
                                                 
28  Leon Lederman, Basic Research’s Big Payoff: A Case In Point, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 
1982, § 4, at 16.  
29  Goldberg, supra note 19, at 96. 
30  See Stephen Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Cycle: Toward Effective Risk 
Regulation 34 (1993) (exploring the difference between public and expert assessments of 
risk from nuclear accidents).   
31  For a detailed discussion and critique of current regulatory efforts to assess fear, see 
Matthew D. Adler, Fear Assessment: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Pricing of Fear and 
Anxiety, 79 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 977, 980-81 (2004).  
32 See, e.g., The World of Nuclear Science, Household Uses of Radiation, 
http://library.thinkquest.org/C004606/applications/household.shtml. (last visited Sept. 22, 
2006).  
33  See Steven Goldberg, Cloning Matters: How Lawrence v. Texas Protects Therapeutic 
Research, 4 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 305, 306 (2004). 
34  Id. at 307. 
35  Id.  
36  Id. 
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In therapeutic cloning, however, no one plans to bring the embryo to 
term.  After a few weeks, the stem cells are removed and used for research.37  
This technique, while controversial, has many supporters,38 as does stem cell 
research generally.  It may have the advantage over ordinary stem cell 
research in that an individual suffering from a disease could be the donor, 
resulting in stem cells that might be particularly useful for studying or 
treating his ailment because they would match his genetic code. 
Proponents of therapeutic cloning would very much like to separate it 
from reproductive cloning in the public mind, since the latter conjures up 
images of hundreds of genetically identical people created for some nefarious 
purpose.  As a result, they have occasionally tried to have everyone refer not to 
“therapeutic cloning” but rather to “somatic cell nuclear transfer” or SCNT.39 
Time will tell whether SCNT will join MRI in popular usage. 
IV. MRIs AND THE PERCEPTION OF RISK IN THE RESEARCH 
SETTING 
MRIs have an enviable reputation for safety.  On September 12—13, 2003, 
the American Association for the Advancement of Science and the Dana 
Foundation held an invitational workshop in Washington, D.C. on 
neuroscience and the law.40  Scientists, judges, and academics discussed the 
legal and philosophical implications of the results coming from functional 
MRIs being given to thousands of patients and volunteers.  At no point in the 
conference did anyone refer to any danger associated with MRIs, indeed no 
one even referred to any possible dangers at all.41  An outside observer would 
have to have been forgiven for erroneously believing that taking an MRI was 
roughly as safe as getting on a scale to find your weight. 
In terms of visible risk, it is not surprising that the leading text on the 
development of MRIs concludes that they operate “safely, comfortabl[y], and 
noninvasively.”42  Of course, no technology is absolutely safe, and those who 
operate MRIs are well aware of that.  Because the MRI exposes a user’s body 
to a powerful magnetic field, it is essential that the user remove metal objects 
such as keys, and that the user inform the staff if the user has a pacemaker, 
shrapnel in the user’s body, or any other material that might be attracted by a 
magnetic field.43  The procedure is not generally used with pregnant women.44  
                                                 
37  Id. at 307-08. 
38  Id. at 312. 
39  See, e.g., Peter Gorner, Wisconsin Weighs Ban on Cloning: Both Sides Accused of 
Verbal Dishonesty in Stem Cell Debate, Chi. Trib., Sept. 19, 2005, at 16; Tom Pelton, Ads 
Paint New Image For Cloning: Those Opposed to a Ban Stress Medical Benefits of Cells from 
Lab Embryos, Balt. Sun, Apr. 25, 2002, at 3A. 
40  The report of the workshop, which was sponsored by the American Association for 
the Advancement of Science and the Dana Foundation, may be found at Neuroscience and 
the Law: Brain, Mind, and the Scales of Justice (Brent Garland ed., 2004). 
41  See id. at 107-108 (discussing future use of functional MRIs without mention of 
dangers). 
42  Mattson supra note 4, at 729. 
43  See, e.g., Prithi Yeleja, Up Close and Personal With an MRI Scan, Toronto Star, 
Feb. 9, 2002, at Y13; RadiologyInfo, Safety: Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) 1-2, (Jan. 10, 
2005), http://www.radiologyinfo.org/en/pdf/sfty_mr.pdf [hereinafter RadiologyInfo].  There 
is some concern that new EU safety rules designed to reduce exposure to electromagnetic 
fields might restrict some MRI usage.  See James Meikle, Science: Scientists’ Fears Force 
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Moreover, as with any piece of equipment, an MRI scanner is dangerous if 
operated improperly,45 and, even when properly performed, the procedure can 
trigger claustrophobia in some users.46  These are more or less routine risks 
that are handled reasonably well through the usual informed consent 
process.47  In recent years, however, a new problem has manifested.   
Conducting research that uses MRIs on apparently healthy subjects 
results in a substantial number of findings that may be of clinical significance.  
Indeed, some studies suggest that such “incidental” findings may turn up in a 
remarkable 20% of the subjects.48  In other words, it turns out that many 
research subjects may be sick without even knowing it.  But the question 
remains: how should the research community react?  To date, there is no 
uniform answer.49 
Our understanding of this area depends in large part on the impressive 
pioneering work of Judy Illes of the Center for Biomedical Ethics at Stanford 
University.  Building on work by Gregory L. Katzman and others,50 Illes and 
her coauthors have published studies and organized workshops to discuss this 
problem.51  They have identified both varying abilities among screening 
institutions to evaluate troubling findings, and inconsistent policies on what 
the study participants will be told when such findings occur.52  The authors 
then argue that it is “ethically desirable” to disclose “suspicious incidental 
findings.”53  
One relatively uncharted portion of this problem demands attention.  As 
Illes wrote, after a recent National Institutes of Health workshop, “[t]he 
potentially harmful consequences of false-positive reports on normal 
volunteers have not been explored.  Some members of the working group felt 
that the potential of false-positives rendered it unwise to communicate all but 
                                                                                                                      
Review of New Restrictions on MRI Scanners: Electromagnetic Exposure Limits Threaten 
Treatments: MPs find No Justification for Curbs on Medical Staff, The Guardian, June 29, 
2006, at 8. 
44  Yeleja, supra note 43, at Y13; RadiologyInfo, supra note 43, at 2.   
45  Ian Marland, Fears Over MRI Scanners, The Scotsman, May 19, 2003, at 2; U.S. 
Food and Drug Administration, MRI Safety (Sept. 18, 2001), 
http://www.fda.gov/cdrh/safety/mrisafety.html.  
46  See, e.g., Curtis v. MRI Imaging Serv. II, 956 P.2d 960, 961 (Or. 1998); Cassidy, 
supra note 16, at 37. 
47  For an example of standard informed consent language used for MRI research, see 
Standard Informed Consent Language for MRI Related Research, Memorial Hospital of 
Rhode Island Committee for Use of Human Subjects in Research, 
http://www.brainscience.brown.edu/MRF/MR.Risks.pdf (last visited Sept. 25, 2006). 
48  Jamie Talan, The Ethics of Scan and Tell, Sci. Am. Mind, June 2005, available at 
http://www.sciammind.com/print_version.cfm?articleID=000F3D24-647A-128A-
A3C683414B7F0000. 
49  Id.  
50  See Gregory L. Katzman et al., Incidental Findings on Brain Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging From 1000 Asymptomatic Volunteers, 282 JAMA 36, 36-39 (1999). 
51  See, e.g., Judy Illes et al., Incidental Findings in Brain Imaging Research, Sci., Feb. 
10, 2006, at 783 (discussing research studies as well as an NIH workshop); Brian S. Kim et al., 
Incidental Findings on Pediatric MR Images of the Brain, 23 Am. J. Neuroradiology 1674, 
1674 (Nov.-Dec. 2002) (studying “the prevalence of incidental findings in a healthy pediatric 
population”). 
52  Illes, supra note 51, at 783-84. 
53  Id. at 783. 
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the most certain incidental finding.”54  In short, even if an MRI appears to 
show a dangerous tumor, there may be good reasons not to disclose this 
finding because it may be false. 
No one knows how many false positives will turn up in research MRI 
screenings.  In one setting, Illes wrote of an “established upper limit” for false 
positives of 2%.55  Even higher rates have been found when high-risk women 
were given MRIs to detect breast cancer,56 and substantial problems have 
resulted when MRIs appear to show problems with the lumbar spine even 
though these problems may not be “clinically relevant.”57  There is no reason to 
suppose that MRIs used for research brain scans will be less prone to this 
problem. 
What is so bad about a false positive?  It can lead to what has been termed 
the “dreaded cascade effect”:58 the apparent discovery of a problem that leads 
to riskier and costlier tests that may themselves be harmful, all triggered by a 
nonexistent problem.59  Even when the later tests do not themselves cause 
harm or lead to unnecessary and risky interventions, “an erroneous positive 
result may cause unnecessary fear and concern in the individual . . . .”60 
This creation of unnecessary fear is why the NIH working group was 
divided on how false positives bear on the ethical duty to notify.61  It is a 
problem that deserves open debate in symposia like this one and open 
disclosure of whatever results are reached: it is not a problem that admits of a 
one-size-fits-all solution.  We are back again to fear.  In a society where the 
very word “nuclear” has to be avoided in the name of a procedure lest subjects 
mistakenly believe they will be given cancer, we can hardly be surprised that 
mistakenly telling subjects that they may have cancer is itself an enormous 
cost of that very procedure. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is widely known that the law regulates activities based not only on their 
actual risks, but on how those risks are perceived.  Thus nuclear energy may 
be a safer way to generate electricity than coal, but the former is subject to 
much more stringent regulation than the latter because of public fears.62  FDA 
regulation of food additives illustrates the same phenomenon;63 indeed, Cass 
Sunstein, in a broad study of government policy and risk assessment, found 
                                                 
54  Id.  
55  Judy Illes, ‘Pandora’s Box’ of Incidental Findings in Brain Imaging Research, 2 
Nature Clinical Prac. Neurology 60, 60 (Feb. 2006). 
56  Press Release, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, MRI May Help Find 
Missed Breast Cancers in High Risk Women: High False Positive Rate Must Be Considered, 
available at http://www.mskcc.org/mskcc/html/13823.cfm (last visited Sept. 25, 2006). 
57  Richard A. Deyo, Magnetic Resonance Imaging of the Lumbar Spine: Terrific Test or 
Tar Baby?, 331 New Eng. J. Med. 115, 115 (July 14, 1994). 
58  Christopher P. Guzelian, A Quantitative Methodology For Determining the Need for 
Exposure-Prompted Medical Monitoring,  79 Ind. L.J. 57, 84 (2004). 
59  Id. at 69. 
60  Id. at 84. 
61  Illes, supra note 51, at 783. 
62  See, e.g., Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1025 
(1983). 
63  See, e.g., Richard A. Merrill, FDA’s Implementation of the Delaney Clause, 5 Yale J. 
On Reg. 1, 76 n.367 (1988).  
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“dramatic disparities in amounts spent per life-year saved” in fields ranging 
from traffic safety to pollution controls.64 
Similar issues arise when decisions are made on the proper scope of 
informed consent, as the debate over whether “the person affected should 
have the absolute right to his or her own risk assessment” before being 
vaccinated makes clear.65  When Institutional Review Boards decide on what 
sort of consent from subjects is needed before a research program can go 
forward, the Boards “are engaged in a process of legal decisionmaking, insofar 
as they interpret specific regulatory requirements pursuant to authority that 
has been delegated to them by administrative agencies.”66  Thus the law will 
be deeply implicated as we debate whether to inform subjects of incidental 
findings from MRIs that may generate enormous anxiety even when those 
findings are false positives or clinically irrelevant. 
 
 
                                                 
64  Cass R. Sunstein, Which Risks First?, 1997 U. Chi. Legal F. 101, 101 (1997). 
65  Karin Schumacher, Note, Informed Consent: Should It Be Extended to Vaccinations?, 
22 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 89, 119 (1999). 
66  Carl H. Coleman, Rationalizing Risk Assessment in Human Subject Research, 46 
Ariz. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2004). 
